

Adam 78351

40W¹

Bill No 10

K could not afford the limitation of (turning his
ship around) & a second time.

Given reaction to threat (letter)

S "

recon

✓ Instructions to Adm., 29 Oct (?)

✓ Bell memo to Pres, 10 Nov:

✓ If SU says

✓ Volpe memo of 3 Oct on types of weapons

✓ SUIE of 18 Sept on Military Buildup in Cuba

(SU is probably uncertain - also more likely than IACM,
but still very unlikely; would expect US reaction; change in
SU policy).

✓ Mandelstam memo of 9 ^{Oct} Nov: trend toward introduction of RSM;
probably also.

✓ McN to Chaps, 2 Oct; 6 contingencies

✓ JCS memo, 18 Oct (?)

✓ 1-5, 19 Oct

See: K letter of 27 Oct to Pres? Black Saturday

Ritz's instructions in Overhighten group, sent to NAC ^{up} 27 Oct

NAC minutes, 23 Oct

JCS comments on Raincoat

First instructions to Finletter for NAC, Oct. 27

Further Swamp with Lewis, etc.

... on ... of my ... party.

AW

He actually brought us into a "position of strength" in
Strategic field (and maybe, whether he nor JFK
would have done it without for German intelligence
estimates; see Lyngby article, Hearings, JFK speech),
yet our expectation of coming "stalemate" — plus
unwillingness to prepare for it by increasing conventional
arms (which were already too weak to permit
initiative: as in Hungary, Maras, Polish riots, Wall) —
kept him tied from exploiting strength or from
developing a strategy of strength.

Instead, we have remained defensive, tied to
a strategy of weakness; a desperate strategy (NSC 68)
appropriate to, say, France versus Soviets; a
strategy of punishment which aims (de Gaulle) to
"take an arm off" — though actually big enough
to slaughter if used "French-style" (WWII-style)
(French didn't have strat. bombardment doctrine then) —
or to disarm SO, considering actual DSO forces.
(JSCD seems related to — many — estimates of future SO capability!)
weaken our estimate of aggression etc. by third party.

Cuba shows importance of initiative capability; though
problem of the "Metastasis of Conflict." (Bundy;
Bell more; fear of this Horizontal Escalation — when
SU Vertical Escalation — can be a way of rationalizing
inaction, or of conceal fear of any risk whatever (of
either sort of escalation).

Only adequate conventional forces permit us to
probe, to counter SU move with threat elsewhere,
to cast back a limited SU move (e.g., Berlin),
to avert result — without involving defenses
unacceptably elsewhere. Superiority is not needed
for these purposes; repel their limited move, challenge them
to raise stakes.

Cuba shows that our nuclear superiority does not
deter them from [avert from limited aggression: McN]
highly provocative probe of our position (looking for weakness,
which it may find?), attempt to demonstrate suspected weakness
in resolution or humanity, to humiliate us or split Alliance or
weaken our attitude of aggression etc. by third party.

may, very

AWW

We must be prepared to act fast and
decisively, in informed way (include lessons) — to
Jared then to lessons — to make sure that
they learn from their experience what we want them
to learn, including costs & risks of such tests.

Also, we want episode to teach allies (+
US public; and...) : e.g. to rely on US, not to fear SU
public, strength of position & unity, etc. etc. rather than
to learn disastrous lessons [even if SU learns right
lessons, it can try to reverse lessons by preventing US allies
from learning right ones — especially if US cooperates in
SU move]. ^(or, lessons in Kremlin) Clearly, SU may expect defect to teach
their friends — looklike allies what we want them
to learn: which it seems to be doing! (Dec 13)

Among contingencies to be planned for (i.e.
against): certain likely, dangerous proposals or moves
within the Administration during a crisis; Participate
there, prepare against, counter-proposals. To what
positions / attitudes do we want US / NATO committed?

Study:

- 1) Implications of gold utilization.
- 2) Impact of Defense Budget.
- 3) Programming, Procurement practices, Costing; Budget Process.
- 4) R&D Policy
- 5) Stockpile, mobilization, reserves / in Controlled War / LW / Post-war
redeployment
- 6) Systems Analysis & Strategic Choice
- 7) C&C in Controlled Response

Crises

Limited War

R&D

Problem common to State Intelligence, Warning, Operational Choice

- 8) Organizations for Operations, Plans, Intel, R&D, Procurement,
State - White House - DOD

% Safety, Control, Stability; Permissiveness level

ASW
usability for press recon.

Dec. 14:

X Paper on MM; see Hoag (can they be based?)

2) Call H.H. Savage

X See memo to George; talk to George. (Rosen, Wolfe, Giver)

X Kary? 27 Dec, 9

3) Xmas shipping?

6) Letters / bills

7) Get Diet

8) Get ticket to Mich.

X Winter travel expenses

Reiter, Kramish, Wolfe (Din, Rosen) on

Phadon on missiles

Sallazar on WWII

(Cohen reviews on A-bomb, H-bomb, H-bomb)

Paul Hammond

Klein, Marshall, Cohen, Jones (Hoffman)

Katz, Digby (Sallazar, de Ward) Belzer, Hoag (Wolfe) (Austin)

AWW
possibly see press recon.

$\frac{1}{x} = x^{-1}$

1970-1971

Handwritten title

André Gide

19. 10.10.1990

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the

17. 10. 1971

10/10/57

John J. Thompson

John H. Brown

Handwritten signature

[illegible]

1. 1922. 1923. 1924. 1925. 1926. 1927. 1928. 1929. 1930. 1931. 1932. 1933. 1934. 1935. 1936. 1937. 1938. 1939. 1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. 1945. 1946. 1947. 1948. 1949. 1950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1957. 1958. 1959. 1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969. 1970. 1971. 1972. 1973. 1974. 1975. 1976. 1977. 1978. 1979. 1980. 1981. 1982. 1983. 1984. 1985. 1986. 1987. 1988. 1989. 1990. 1991. 1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000. 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013. 2014. 2015. 2016. 2017. 2018. 2019. 2020. 2021. 2022. 2023. 2024. 2025. 2026. 2027. 2028. 2029. 2030. 2031. 2032. 2033. 2034. 2035. 2036. 2037. 2038. 2039. 2040. 2041. 2042. 2043. 2044. 2045. 2046. 2047. 2048. 2049. 2050. 2051. 2052. 2053. 2054. 2055. 2056. 2057. 2058. 2059. 2060. 2061. 2062. 2063. 2064. 2065. 2066. 2067. 2068. 2069. 2070. 2071. 2072. 2073. 2074. 2075. 2076. 2077. 2078. 2079. 2080. 2081. 2082. 2083. 2084. 2085. 2086. 2087. 2088. 2089. 2090. 2091. 2092. 2093. 2094. 2095. 2096. 2097. 2098. 2099. 2100. 2101. 2102. 2103. 2104. 2105. 2106. 2107. 2108. 2109. 2110. 2111. 2112. 2113. 2114. 2115. 2116. 2117. 2118. 2119. 2120. 2121. 2122. 2123. 2124. 2125. 2126. 2127. 2128. 2129. 2130. 2131. 2132. 2133. 2134. 2135. 2136. 2137. 2138. 2139. 2140. 2141. 2142. 2143. 2144. 2145. 2146. 2147. 2148. 2149. 2150. 2151. 2152. 2153. 2154. 2155. 2156. 2157. 2158. 2159. 2160. 2161. 2162. 2163. 2164. 2165. 2166. 2167. 2168. 2169. 2170. 2171. 2172. 2173. 2174. 2175. 2176. 2177. 2178. 2179. 2180. 2181. 2182. 2183. 2184. 2185. 2186. 2187. 2188. 2189. 2190. 2191. 2192. 2193. 2194. 2195. 2196. 2197. 2198. 2199. 2200. 2201. 2202. 2203. 2204. 2205. 2206. 2207. 2208. 2209. 2210. 2211. 2212. 2213. 2214. 2215. 2216. 2217. 2218. 2219. 2220. 2221. 2222. 2223. 2224. 2225. 2226. 2227. 2228. 2229. 2230. 2231. 2232. 2233. 2234. 2235. 2236. 2237. 2238. 2239. 2240. 2241. 2242. 2243. 2244. 2245. 2246. 2247. 2248. 2249. 2250. 2251. 2252. 2253. 2254. 2255. 2256. 2257. 2258. 2259. 2260. 2261. 2262. 2263. 2264. 2265. 2266. 2267. 2268. 2269. 2270. 2271. 2272. 2273. 2274. 2275. 2276. 2277. 2278. 2279. 2280. 2281. 2282. 2283. 2284. 2285. 2286. 2287. 2288. 2289. 2290. 2291. 2292. 2293. 2294. 2295. 2296. 2297. 2298. 2299. 2300. 2301. 2302. 2303. 2304. 2305. 2306. 2307. 2308. 2309. 2310. 2311. 2312. 2313. 2314. 2315. 2316. 2317. 2318. 2319. 2320. 2321. 2322. 2323. 2324. 2325. 2326. 2327. 2328. 2329. 2330. 2331. 2332. 2333. 2334. 2335. 2336. 2337. 2338. 2339. 2340. 2341. 2342. 2343. 2344. 2345. 2346. 2347. 2348. 2349. 2350. 2351. 2352. 2353. 2354. 2355. 2356. 2357. 2358. 2359. 2360. 2361. 2362. 2363. 2364. 2365. 2366. 2367. 2368. 2369. 2370. 2371. 2372. 2373. 2374. 2375. 2376. 2377. 2378. 2379. 2380. 2381. 2382. 2383. 2384. 2385. 2386. 2387. 2388. 2389. 2390. 2391. 2392. 2393. 2394. 2395. 2396. 2397. 2398. 2399. 2400. 2401. 2402. 2403. 2404. 2405. 2406. 2407. 2408. 2409. 2410. 2411. 2412. 2413. 2414. 2415. 2416. 2417. 2418. 2419. 2420. 2421. 2422. 2423. 2424. 2425. 2426. 2427. 2428. 2429. 2430. 2431. 2432. 2433. 2434. 2435. 2436. 2437. 2438. 2439. 2440. 2441. 2442. 2443. 2444. 2445. 2446. 2447. 2448. 2449. 2450. 2451. 2452. 2453. 2454. 2455. 2456. 2457. 2458. 2459. 2460. 2461. 2462. 2463. 2464. 2465. 2466. 2467. 2468. 2469. 2470. 2471. 2472. 2473. 2474. 2475. 2476. 2477. 2478. 2479. 2480. 2481. 2482. 2483. 2484. 2485. 2486. 2487. 2488. 2489. 2490. 2491. 2492. 2493. 2494. 2495. 2496. 2497. 2498. 2499. 2500. 2501. 2502. 2503. 2504. 2505. 2506. 2507. 2508. 2509. 2510. 2511. 2512. 2513. 2514. 2515. 2516. 2517. 2518. 2519. 2520. 2521. 2522. 2523. 2524. 2525. 2526. 2527. 2528. 2529. 2530. 2531. 2532. 2533. 2534. 2535. 2536. 2537. 2538. 2539. 2540. 2541. 2542. 2543. 2544. 2545. 2546. 2547. 2548. 2549. 2550. 2551. 2552. 2553. 2554. 2555. 2556. 2557. 2558. 2559. 2560. 2561. 2562. 2563. 2564. 2565. 2566. 2567. 2568. 2569. 2570. 2571. 2572. 2573. 2574. 2575. 2576. 2577. 2578. 2579. 2580. 2581. 2582. 2583. 2584. 2585. 2586. 2587. 2588. 2589. 2590. 2591. 2592. 2593. 2594. 2595. 2596. 2597. 2598. 2599. 2600. 2601. 2602. 2603.

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

1940

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

John F. Kennedy

201. 1111 by photo recon. 7

17. 2. 1944. 1944. 1944.

capability for photo recon.]

K: "SU has no need to achieve its objectives by means of war, or by military means."

But: "SU has no need to deploy missiles outside its borders."

(2)
Rentsch: in last quarter of 1961, SU produced more still than US, for the first time (US was producing at 50% of capacity).

[Calculate current capability in US for Type III Deterrence; for expansion of aid; for buildup of conventional capability]

Rentsch: Only if, by economic competition, we can overtake the non-military sector of SU can we put pressure on SU to reduce its military spending, to divert resources to non-military sector.

UN Regional Universities.

17 Dec.

Reuther: Guided Missiles and Missiles Men

[Title for article on Cuba: Suddenly Lost Autumn]

[Predict cost of crises, cost of small wars
(cost of exercises, maneuvers). Look at costs incurred
(by components) in Lebanon, Thailand, Quinoy, Cuba;
estimate for given scenarios. Compare to costs of
measures to reduce prob. of crises, wars: info systems,
C+C, posture. Cost of WWII, Korea. Counter guerrilla.
Costs of forces expended, transport, stocks, etc.;
^{value} costs of capital destroyed;

[Calculate: value of photos of Cuban missiles — in
convincing allies, public, US decision-makers, reducing
disagreement: is opposed to other forms of intelligence.

Contrast to cost of operations. Consider gaps in
capability for photo recon.]

Rentler:

K's confidence is based on his belief that our form of society can meet the challenges of peace. He knows that we can unite and act effectively in time of war; but doesn't think our factions can coordinate effectively in time of low tension.

[How much is K counting on the advantages of dealing with an alliance? e.g., was this a major factor in SU's move into Cuba: was this big surprise, Allied reaction? Or perhaps: US more decisive + firm + fast enough to win Allied respect and followership? Improved US crisis machinery may be the way to avoid the weaknesses of crisis allied policy. Formulate the Allied responses, Alliance propensities, that threaten Allied cohesion and effectiveness in a crisis; prepare planned US responses, institutional changes to forestall Allied dissolution or paralysis or surrender].

[For crises: Plan + prepare for uncertainty, ignorance, mistakes, and different opinions, differences in beliefs, info and goals within US govt, and within Western Alliance.]

[Political "responsible" decision-maker must evaluate a component of national strategy for which he is responsible not in the context of a system optimized as a whole, with other components adapted to this one, but in the context of the probable states of other components. This requires him to know the current and ~~But the likely~~ likely (or possible, within given period or by certain methods): one of the virtues of "responsibility."

But a cost of "responsibility" is that he has little time to explore — and may even be prohibited from exploring — the consequences or desirability of changes in other components for which he is not "responsible." Thus, there is tendency to identify the "probable" or "assumed" states of other parts of the system as the current states (partly from ignorance, organizational caution, lack of time for contingency planning).

Thus, when "academic" evaluates counterforce as if NATO had adequate conventional capability, "responsible" bureaucrat may tend to evaluate counterforce as if current inadequacies could never or would never change.

Auth Adams: 19 Dec.

Aziland left the country for Geneva (with his wife) on 24 Oct., Wednesday, as blockade started.

He was convinced:

- a) SU would never put missiles in Cuba
- b) US was tampering w/ evidence, trying to provoke SU response.
- c) US was planning to strike first.

[Note: can't say this would have been the worst way to go first: SU was not alert, perhaps deliberately so. Nor was NATO.]

d) Thus, prob of war (US first strike) was about 90%.

[Note: Geneva was not so dumb under the assumption of a US first strike.]

Domenick, 18 Dec. Thought prob of war was very high, though not 90%.

McNaughton: Devolution of authority from Pres is
carefully preserved.

"No" order must come from the highest authority.

But:

"Killing them first, with the mostest" is absolute.

Killing them too soon, with too much, may run directly
counter to the national interest.

DE.

1. No Stop message prepared or authorized or potentially authenticated with bombers on airborne alert or Positive Control, for use after they have received a Go order (i.e., on the ground, or in the air after receiving a "Launch" order launching them on airborne alert or Positive Control).

Thus, in case SU surrenders between initiation of OS attack and arrival of bombers (e.g., after US missile arrival) — which might be 10-14 hours for most bombers — there is no way even to delay (or divert, retarget, or postpone or cancel) the major part, or any, of the bomber attack on the SU.

Solution: a) ~~Can~~ Put a "Cancel" message, ^{code} in the Positive Control envelope, along with "Go" code. Study and develop procedures for re-directing bombers after they have received a "Go" order.

2. Have procedures relating to execute merges, Positive Control, weapon safety, unauthorized action in planes, minutes and Command Posts, been studied in the Pacific Command as carefully and comprehensively as in NATO, CONAD and SAC?

Two years ago, the answer was strongly; No.

Procedures differed from one subordinate or station command to the next; some were much less reliable than others. In general, the procedures affecting the young, junior officers flying F-100's alone were not nearly as careful as those relating to SAC bomber crews. E.g., they did not, like SAC, receive regular briefings on Positive Control procedures and sign statement that they understood (interviews showed dangerous uncertainties). Nor that they have an "invariable code", such as recently developed for SAC.

"Resolution of rising expectations" → "resolution of rising demands" (willingness to die, pay, risk, threaten, force, to improve lot); Underdeveloped nations have problems that PROBLEMS they didn't "have" (recognize as problems) before.

"It's not my problem" ("That's a real problem; I'm glad it's not mine.")

a) Bureaucratic responsibility for sub-problems is one criterion ("That's his problem").

b) Or: refusal for bargaining purposes to "recognize" certain problems: force effort to "solve" (them of "children").

c) Lack of alternatives or inability to pursue "problem-solving process" because of lack of time.

[Good: "This method is to be used only on problems that are unimportant or urgent."]

("I can't worry about that problem").

Issue: Is there a sufficient prob that I can achieve an acceptable solution (or, sufficiently better solution)

Foster:

✓ Cuba: don't underestimate importance of availability of landing craft.

[Is it 'good' for SU to acquire bigger second-strike capability?] If deterrence should then fail, damage would be higher.

✓ [Also, less deterrence of lesser-but-larger SU 'provocations'. Alternative deterrents are possible, preferable, desirable: but they don't adequately exist today; and it would be irresponsible for US Pres to act in every respect and in every context as if they did exist. Those who would urge him to do so — e.g. by adopting no-first-use-of-nuclears policy — often ignore such consequences as the effect of on NATO nations, incentive to develop independent national deterrents (which will not substitute either for conventional arms — to deter small aggression — nor for the US guarantee of first strike — to deter large aggression)]

Fortin: SC broke nostrum a year ago; "We are
objective enough to realize that history might not
repeat itself; but we do require more assurance than
a New Year's resolution."

London, 1950, was a year of great interest
in the history of the world, particularly in the
history of the United States. (The office
of the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, was
in the White House, and the Secretary of
State, Mr. Acheson, was in the White House.)

The Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, was in the
White House, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson,
was in the White House.

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White House, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson,
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White House, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson,
was in the White House.

What is a "lie"? (as in, were K's minute claims
'lies'?)



Element of intent, consciousness.

Issue: what is the 'claim' to be evaluated?

What were words? Context? Audience(s)?

Consider ^{of war} prisoner, who makes a statement that he intends
(hopes) to be interpreted in a particular way by an
audience that has special knowledge (e.g. of his
background, setting, goals, usage), though it
would be interpreted differently (in a way such that
it would be false) by other, uninformed, "typical"
audiences.

To what extent is the proposition a matter of 'fact',
susceptible of being demonstrated to be "true" or "false?"

[^{as} "In war, truth is the first casualty."]

Danger of relying on "explicit analysis"

of "replacing man by machine" (program)

(bureaucracy
formal):

that system will then be able to do only
what we (designers) know how to explain to do

know how to teach, analytically +
systematically

know, diminishes importance of what we know

Indoctrination of President:

not just responsibility, complexity, uncertainty, experience.

but: Mysteries: natural
knowledge } previously hidden,
practices } guarded
threats }
(What President has previously had?)
like? Had Cold War material?)

"Political scientists" are prevented from knowing how the
system operates, now — or in the past, since the secret
is well kept (better than they can imagine — so they don't know
extent of their ignorance, as they compare what they "know" now with
— what they "learn" about the past).

Difficulty of learning from "experts," or from "the
uninstructed," (unlearned, = (from someone "different").

What they don't know, condemns them.
disqualifies them

Psychologists, economists, psychoanalysts; social scientists.

(Physical scientists, known to know "the secrets
of the atom" (but they did back: got benefit of the secrets.
The bomb worked. True Believers, they).

[To learn, or to learn, someone who doesn't know what we
know, diminishes importance of what we know

Frederic Stone

Woods Institute

Hamm-on-Hudson, N.Y.

914

RO-2-0700 (Witchster
Conn)

Harold Kuhn

Dept of Mathematics

Princeton University

Princeton, N.J.

11 Aug 64

Interim Report 15 July 64

① ^{explains}
[By attending to differences between war games and reality]

Big stake poker vs. matchballs.

In real crises:

- 1) Command ^{process} breaks out of normal channels.
- 2) Effects of ^{on decisions} power, threat, (responsibility & publicity)
real evidence threat.

[3. ^{error} Difficulties

4. Commitment, predictions, warnings.

5. Political opposition, critics

6. Internal resistance { ^{oversee}
compensation
high level rigidity

Sec II

2. "History that is pertinent to the problems of the operator."

Focus on mechanism and process rather than outcome
alone; on the form in which events presented themselves
to those in ^{line of} command responsibility; with all the

confusions, behind alleg, unknowns, ambiguities presented.
Usual history is not only not helpful, but is deeply misleading. Doesn't

lead on to purpose for and repeat complexity,
ambiguity, ...

Commanders' Reports:

1. Above advice, since they really trust and desire address of when they have to allocate listening time clearly. Excommunication
2. Desire to work in privacy, by phone a face-to-face.

[How/why was it important to see K-L letters?]

[Was "communication" a real problem in Cuban crisis; was problem one of explaining or convincing of K's understanding or his belief?]

[Was it useful to convince caution to K, as dictated from being cautious?] (though need to rationalize caution the way.)
/1

How would Johnson know of Pers participation?

SG?

Role of SI?

Diplomacy with USSR, ...


"no record of the issue rising above" the
level of the Def and Under Sec State. CC

Why did Brown back Sauvama, instead of Phonmi?

Where were French?

Why State emphasis on negotiated settlement?

Forces needed; so major change of forces
had to be supported; but he in conflict
with more State wanted to support
(Two sets of "good guys")



Summarized

MO92, 22 Oct

1. Cuba: DEFCON 3 message sent out in clear, 5 hours ahead of speech — to go to 3 at time of speech. Are EAP grand to US responses, rather than to US-initiated actions?

[Pike's message, TSX to CINCS, criticized as departure from procedures, too limited in dist.

But...!]

(Johnson also criticized!)

2. Cuban Planning Group role (2 Oct?)
Johnson Task Force

3. Why did JCS meet in Hotel Room instead of NMCC?

4. Real possibility of operating from alternate site? Problems?

5. Possibility of a) SOPs for crisis ops

b) "Panels" of cleared people.

6. Are there really, crisis EAPs? Plans for messages, identifying?

20 Oct Fighting began between Chinese & Indian troops

22-23 Oct Yemeni aircraft attacked Aden territory
and O.T. presence of Egyptian troops on Yemen admitted.

3 Nov first shipment of US arms to India arrived.

7 Effect of using SSO channels for communication!

Stalin had: manage traffic, 1-3. some files
+ interviews

Look of sources of WSEG studies:

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. White House | } | meetings | telecons |
| 2. JCS | | memos | informal mtg |
| 3. NSC | | agenda | EO cables |
| 4. SG | | letters | Pres - foreign letters |
| 5. USIB | | drafts | Dip. contacts; memos |
| 6. COMOR, etc. | | working papers | Dip. |
| 7. OSD | | NSA/MS | |
| 8. State
Sec | | SNIEs? | |
| 9. CIA ^{DDI} DDP | | CIA ^{INR} memos | |
| 10. Diplomatic; Conferees | | Conference minutes | |
| 11. Anti Commun. | | ONE, DIA, INR | |

12. SI ; and traffic over SSO channels.

13. T, K ; COMOR, SG etc.

14. All source intell. bulletins

W509 : Staff: view

Also, important measures of:

1. Power cells

2. Power Flow ; org 96, etc.

3. Info available to top: Estimates, SI, T, K, CIB, CL
Dipl, letters, telegrams

4. Political motives, coalitions (e.g. election campaign)

5. Alliances, signs, pressures

6. Personal stakes

7. Power of problem by help decision making, Pres, etc.

8. Central influence of intelligence process

9. Current of process

(5101, ROP "functions" are more visible?)

In Laos

at Lammont's request

In ~~Jan~~ Dec 1960, the Laos were supporting the
"legal" ^{which recognized} govt of Laos, and we were covertly supporting
a rebel movement. When this took over, we couldn't get

allies (except Thai, Phil, SVN and China) to recognize it!

Why wasn't France more active? Where were her forces?

Dec. 13 - Laos received US - aircraft - & military personnel.

List reasons for covertness.

^{CAS}
Role of CAT, Air America, Thair, B-26s, T-6s,


Action of King L. - a CAS favorite - similar to

actions of SVN special troops vs. Buddhists, under Vong?

How did American Embassy influence?

Description of allies? (their knowledge of camp?)

Any surprises?



altitude of Mansfield

What to French & British see as future of coalition
with pro-Communist in it?

Phonetic transcription of writing to run a separate Southern States!

Had been studying the Geneva Records

Suspended Constitution, etc.

Bankers might prefer 3 way split of country.

"Attack" by "VM - Champs" recently to RLG, and
accepted by world press had to be countered
by US (London) — (even if phony?) just as
British Gulf "incidents" had to be countered, to save
US prestige.

Parallel: RLG claims of VM, UC
Turkey claims of flight to Syria
Cuban claims of two missiles

W

4



Why didn't we move ^{SO} early in support of Laos?

Form of DRV-PRC intervention?

[Technique? Find out what an estimate would say;
then get on, etc.]


Was there a decision ^{in Jan '61} to give ODP major responsibility
for ground military ops in Laos & Laos?

(Rutge, Givell, McAllen?)

State - purely diplomatic, political moves

DDO - purely military

CIA - purely covert



Chances of ambiguity, shortsightedness, problem-solving,
search.

In major crises, who risks a mistake not from
data-calculation or transmission; e.g., a staff report,
or, as from decisions, judgments, performance
(asking questions, evaluating, planning, preparations &
activities, authorizing, risky info-gathering, making
statements, interpreting evidence, defining goals) of
key individuals at the top.

How improves their performance, their direction?
Knowledge problems: how improve their support?

Bureaucracy headed by a politician, an institution
with broad responsibilities (not a bureaucrat).

and: responsibility to pass on info, inform

Challenges to centralization:

- 1) Inference process with constraints:
while being in the process
Info. may not given, goals not given (unlike central theory).
Lapses, less not given (unlike decision models).

2) Control process with constraints (diagnosis, goals, conflicts)

Observation:

Violence, constraints in control, disregard, limitation
(Gung, Fisher, (D. 2), Jackson, Kelly, (Blythe))

Agreement as an element

3) Day - note team

(for thought as well).

Plutonium costs of calculating, asking, deciding

Planning

Factor in surprise - uncertainties

& simple lack of anticipation

Effects of decision process on responsibility

& in credibly interests, goals, etc.

note: responsibility to pass on info, inform

HOPEFUL INTENTIONS

Crises of High Power

Crises is the Health of The President

Crises is crises Decision making

Crises is crises (the crises crises to crises)

3)

Examination

Examine crises crises

Examine History

Examine of crises

Examine - crises

Examine & Description

Examine

Examine crises

Study

EXAMINATION

Power: 402-294X-4111

Col. A.A. [unclear]

986-6299Z H15

1. If war comes, it is likely to
start of tests & war commitments, see the policies,
and losses and successes are largely borne in
war.

Thus, interaction in the quality of decision-making
in crisis
of control of management of crisis

[Crisis management: making management of crisis
crisis?]

Management of messages and actions as messages
to: business, track, persuade in front
by: the President, in trust, follow advice
then, diplomacy - of diplomats, etc.

Also: a cognitive problem: in crisis, informed
unplanned:
a political problem: a failure in tests.

11. Final.

Crisis as Failure. as Parts.

Crisis as Impairment. Surprise → from misbelief →

crisis from bad prediction of other system, self. → failure. ^{admission} ^{admission}

Crisis as Dialog. Multi-^{admission} ^{admission} Dialog of kinds.

Disruption, Disruption, Disruption. Equivocal. Multi-^{admission} ^{admission}

Crisis as Limits. ^{Dialog of kinds of kinds.} ^{high noon.}

Crisis as Health of the Presidency. Press info; Press
matters; Press background.

Internal history. Internal conflict. Broken mirror.

- Indegeneracy of
- 1) Control theory
 - 2) Team Theory. Team Theory
 - 3) Decision theory
 - 4) Org theory. (Press over measurement)

[Distinction:]

Dist. between coercive threats and
control/experience of guilt & anxiety.

$A \Rightarrow B$

1) A (or C) can make B feel guilty for making threats against A — or even, failing to comply with A's wishes.

2) B will (under form of guilt) submit to a "socialization/education/legitimation" process that will bring his guilt feelings under attack of (symbolic/power) ~~legitimation~~ established by A (or C): i.e. can be should disobey or threaten B.

3) No consequence of 1+2: A can create anxiety for B but B "cannot" create anxiety for A

↓
Also a result of great disparity in power.

A STUVWXYZ
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNPOQR

Evolution is stability of a feedback
process.

as Control System whose output is a
Disturbance (or input? change in environment?)
(change component structure?) to another
Control System.

Together, we have a joint Conflict System
whose stability (say to third party, or disaster,
or unmeasurable physiological "disturbances")

Col Morgan, ESD Decision Series

Crisis Management

Crisis Manager

President

2 times each of Morning
Step. Read to product files - to supports - to answer

unmarked questions

With
But little guidance from President?

a) No Time

b) Primary

1) Failure

What can the social sciences contribute to understanding

- Understanding of your own organization - machines with human

components

- Performance in crisis

Know Thyself : See yourself as others see you

Most crises take place at High Noon;
the disputes on both sides have stopped
aside; the citizens watch passively; the
whole situation; the two leaders confront each
other, move toward a confrontation down a
narrow, deserted street.

Population views. An hour later, strikingly accurate
the quality of the situation is clear; the situation is already
the life-taking officers, easy to recognize the
role of the President; carrying out of policies,
may proceed with the participation of the
leader in authority, only because taken; he must choose
the small fraction of the office.

But in crisis, the force, command command.

After a day or two, the clear management is required -
coordinated, fast action - command needed.

Policies must be changed (or changes considered);
crises must be brought to a head, decisions determined,
urgent action prepared & considered.

As a professional but the Press: by authority,
by reputation, by range and depth of responsibility.
He will want his judgment to be controlling....

Press as crisis manager. As one can manage it for him.
But indirectly then. Considerations:

Journal of everything we know about crises,
and more, is probably a "denial" of the true,
fighting, characteristics of crises. our habits limit
chief of our human capabilities to control, to judge
wisely - quickly, in real situations, under threats,
often surprise, without plans....

If war comes, it will come out of a crisis -- probably
as a result of a crisis of "peace" decision-making
in a crisis, situations of urgent need, ~~press~~ in which
early violent action demands attention

How to avoid crises

How to prepare for them

How to govern them ("technical warning")

How to act wisely and swiftly when they occur.

Known defects in our
approach to understanding of crisis phenomena. How
and how many of the crises; how are crises
caused? How do the choices of different nations
interact, under what conditions does this interaction
lead out, which does it explode?

Special topic: social crises, not to pass over.
crisis - structural disintegration.
So many of the crises are accidental, this narrows
understanding of behavior: understanding + prediction
leads to leadership of behavior: understanding + prediction
of accidental crises. (1961)

Ent. P. as an object of academic analysis, the
crisis phenomenon is a ~~complex~~ mystery; it is at the
heart of several layers of ignorance: it is a
mystery ^{unfathomable} within a visible world of signs. The
outer darkness is the process of the interaction of

Several large businesses acting upon each other in complex & mysterious ways; of one of these, we know to be a "Black Box", whose inner structure and processes was concealed from us. One more, we think was more.

That is inevitable. The inner darkness is the shadow of our own ignorance — especially, our national identity resulting in the last generation of Cold War, of ideological polarization, consciousness of conflict & challenge & uncertainty. It is in neither Black Box. BROKEN MIRROR;

And the heart of darkness is the performance of the President — despite the fact, that a) our own


b) publicity

Place in Black Box. Only part of info, only part of output; almost nothing of process.

Contrast of our past, influence.

Our inner behavior is not shown when we go into individual people, great people (though, within our domain); O.K.

Review of 1977



But specimens are usually hidden & can be
"invisible." That is to say, they have been hidden in
hidden history.

Result: a) poor prediction of his side, interest
by staff; poor planning, collection
b) poor prediction of by using a factor of
determine, difficulty of collect some - concern
energy.

How c) Poor prediction of many prediction

There, increased technical that

a) effort will make challenge

B (if to is small, may be too small)

b) his more will come a reaction

c) was will be unprepared to respond

Effects of surveying.

(a) Bad for social scientists]

b) Bad for staff follows. through

c) Bad for staff understanding of, anticipation
of Group behaviour; time, planning, preparation

[Imp. of info. - What is its use? Needs?]

Bad of breaking banks. "Crisis banks."

Illig. in. My hands. (do better in. telling answers)

Staff problem is to prepare answers to
(unasked, anticipated) questions;

but questions are (the) information.)]

d) Lack of feedback from (staff +) third parties
(through banks)

e) Bad understanding by affiliates, allies.

f) Bad prediction of affiliates/allies, predictions
behaviour of them in group distorted, but based partly
on info. to them that staff don't see.]

implications for social scientists:

- 1) Learning can be eliminated - can be reduced and
- but: 2) the effects can be better understood
- 3) End effects can be reduced; less surprise
- 4) Some tentative judgments based on available; more search for hypotheses
- 5) Some scientists can pay price of access.
- 6) Others can study in less sensitive settings, recreational behavior; org. to high level decision-making in large organizations.

x Com Observation of Personal Identity

a) Learning

c) Staffs, middle levels int. ext.

Was there a question of being something? A crisis?
Planning? Why not? What if SAC, or similar, had
come out of the blue without prior talks, or testing?
Who drew the line; and why?

Plates: over and over again it made heads of ground
observed by proving their reports inaccurate
or wrong.

Two classical invitations to error in estimating binocular
1) neglect or misinterpretation of evidence because
it does not match hypothesis or preconceived hypothesis.
2) Looking for problems under way (not raising hypotheses,
giving insight of evidence, giving opinion?)

(There was a strong alternative hypothesis — post
experience, + evidence, both suggested a stopping place
to the military process — though not necessarily
about of IL-28's or FRO's, troops; but made them
contingent on the rest of whether there would provoke
a US military reaction.) [Would they? If we were
in contact — which did not specify military actions.
Were IL-28's, SAMs a test? Lorenson did show
sensitivity to SAMs — deliberate, deliberate effort — what might
have been wrong? but we did nothing, as the offensive
formula.

2/25/67

~~19~~ 19 Sept. assessed possibility that SU would send weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more "offensive" character.

[Paraphrasing that they might use words this way amounts to saying that the words they were using did not constitute a clear reassurance.

Why didn't anyone ask? Some because they didn't believe there was a real danger.

Whether or not would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Sov relations than the USSR has displayed thus far.

[Depends on the amount of risk the Sovs estimate; i.e. their estimate of JFK's crisis behavior; one est. assumes they would see risk high; this is a prediction.

Great Power Disruption

Hard to conceal from great power; easier to deceive, mislead

Intent — about timing, precise target, purpose

(which affects other actions taken or avoided simultaneously
or subsequently, actions of others supported or opposed)

Why deceive? If it is necessary, that suggests the
existence of major cross collaboration

Call on Report to FIB:

a) "McC is just internationally suspicious?"

b) McC was always for more action - everywhere.

(Suggested on Oct 7 - had no real evidence of murder).

c) International special group on action intell.

But effects of

d) Common Overland Route look features of determining on question & allocation of flights for month, the not wanting to consider more (with month) W? That question had been blown - even though that side of flights might run into the next month, because of bad weather.

On 10 Sept, they set question which I'd - because of weather constraints set - was not completed TLL flights? Oct 7. That it was directed at finding intent of FIB; these already found were not shown even again.

The instructions of "PCC" available after mid-Sept were not such as to make specific investigation seem necessary (well?) Although suspicious area included on flight

Monday Oct 10 (mainly to check EAT, even earlier.)

Source: 1 Committee on Personnel Review: C/H

2) Meetings of Ex-Lam (minutes from 20th by Andy
Nitzsche?) State

3) Training Manual - State

4) SWE Oct. 19

5) Final draft of Pers. Plan, night of Oct 19

6) Memorandum letter to SFR 22 Oct. State

7) Persons: Delany - Thompson E?

- Johnson E

- Conner (Oct 13, 24 67) State

One made 36.5. February, assuming US would not
liberate.

18. The same of blockade - large strike night of 1904?

[On 11.11. set of 7 days to prepare in Italy, + 7.11. for invasion]

[Should formulate analysis of effects of invasion?]

2. [What if 10-2 had been date down? What
meaning for this, Oct 16-28? What was read
from 2nd failure to shoot? How clear was message
to have 16-22 of flight thought to be?

10. What discussion, Tuesday evening Oct 16?

Who did Dan talk to between 9 and 11:45?

Evening: 6:30 meeting? Who? Who in Lee State's meeting?

11? What happened?

11. Who had "mistake" action? Body in

12. What were early attitudes of Ep. Comm on the
remaining puzzles of perception? SC description? SC
expectations? Relation to politics, the Union?

13. What defensive behavior appeared early: e.g. intell.
Comm, to cover failure?

13 Oct: Comm vs. ...

6. Who was told Oct 14 - really? Who told him why?

Who was not told, who was told soon thereafter?

Who was left out ultimately?

When, during evening?

Little was in by accident of timing, presence?
absence?

Did any one besides M.G. want to talk to Pers? Did
they know he didn't know?

7. What were their first reactions - Oct 15? What

and why to? Who did they tell? Any anxiety, prior
to exp. com. meeting?

8. Did O-2 fly on Oct 16? Might Pers have ordered this
Oct 15?

73, 29, 15, 41 -

70, 78, 26

[What other advantageous moves for BO are being regarded as unlikely because 'too risky' or because of other pressures underlying Cuban estimates?]

3. Where info on Committee on Overland Access? What info?

What was our planning in case of incidents?

Are ops worldwide coordinated — special case to avoid incidents when on important operations is going on?

4. Was Bt 10 meeting scheduled because of Scott's problems?

Was flight cancelled? Were missions considered?

5. When did pressure build for inviol. of BOB's status? Why?

(MC's schedule?)

1. When were the OSI instructions on photo identification?

2. When were info on IL-58a released to public?

[Was it important to the crossing of 15-22 Oct that special security was attached already to offensive ops in Cuba — because of political considerations?

~ Oct 4, Oct 12-72.

[Question for Top Com: What were the effects on U.S. decision-making of: surprise, deception; prior mis-estimates?

What could K have reduced his risks? Reduced success? What would have been effects of telling Pasa?

Suppose Pasa had known of number etc. time of intervention in SV? What would he have done?]

Crisis, Decision + Response

I am emphasizing emotion as an effect and a cause;
the introductory consideration ignored in the "decision" approach,
which does not ask Why the alternatives, contingencies
values are seen as they are, or how/why they change.

The emotional response is not, altogether, chosen
deliberately (though it may be learned; & the extent to
which it is revealed or explained may be controlled.)

and it is then affects response variables in some
ways "uncontrolled by the ego" — i.e. not chosen — not
adapted to conscious goals & expectations of future consequences.

anger, fear, hatred (from ^{anxiety, depression} humiliation) affects
values and expectations, moral behaviors, alternatives
& considered, perceived, goals, etc. — in ways not explicit,
conscious, or "chosen."

(Anger may also be useful, and be used;
it can be deliberately increased, or be flung.

Thus, not all effects of the "info that produces emotion"

can be described in terms of Bayes' Theorem.

Important parts of governmental response
of our note "closed" or "decided" by highest officials
(though someone may have "decided" them; but of these,
important parts may not have been "decided" by
anyone).

(e.g. high officials may have determined or specified
them — without using a process of "decisions".)

Contrast is to the "Team" approach — which assumes
^{constant} common (organizational) structures, models (though
different evidence and action-responsibilities).

(Ultimately, our success loses focus on emotions, or
splits in goals/values/models between "politically responsible
officials" and bureaucrats.

Do Presidents influence gov response — in ways
not determined by the bureaucracy, or public, explicit
premises defining the "national interest" before the event?

linear challenges costs of calculation, search, "brady, etc."
as limits on "rational planning"

if focus on costs in the form of political costs,
risks, dangers, rather than revenue costs.

Costs of calculation, considering, expecting / productivity
processing, "being informed", [e.g. responsibility to
pass on info"] of certain kinds, or from certain sources — to
others with different models, goals; hence, reference is
some cases for "not being told; not knowing" (of
preparation; or, of info that would be misinterpreted, or would
lead to "bad" reporting beliefs, or pressures for action).

Effects of "decision process" on responsibility :
potential challenge: criticism

Ignorance As A Expense

(e.g. for not informing others — Congress, public,
Allies; not "passing on info.")

Means-ends (i.e. actions-consequences-values)
Linear sequences ...

But means-ends approach, starting with goals/ends (like "problem solving," or "control" approach) lead inevitably to consideration of search for alternatives, means; where "decision" approach assumes means given, after some evaluation of them, rather than invention, discovery, search.

However, decision approach does suggest a search for goals/values/ends, as to to choose; i.e. as a basis for comparison and choice. Systems analysis.

Whereas means-ends may assume ends given, totally specified in advance, unchanging.

Presidential Role

Alternative first approximations.

1) To mediate disputes, define ends, evaluate ends, and score policies / programs, without reference or consideration of Administration / party / personal interests.

2) To increase / maintain power and influence of nation (to achieve goals ^{general goals, or} largely defined elsewhere: Economy, public, Congress, pressure groups, party)

3) to maintain his Administration in office (satisfying) (and his own place in history, and his own current prestige and influence).

Internal War ed. Harry Eckstein Free Press 64
Political Power ^{US/USSR} Eyeginske + Huntington Viking 64
Rosen 3603 H. Montgomery Hyde Pantheon-Stevens
Korea - The Limited War Daniel Press St. Martin's, 64
British Politics in the Suez Crisis Am. Ill. Press Epstein

Fairly complete and necessary

Notes for necessary:

1) Keep promises from committing himself to countermeasures which he will then have to carry out.

He might have to commit himself if he (& his public) knows of more — because of prior position, his public or other attitude. He might be encouraged to do so by belief that we are unable to make more progress, either (JFK vs K in Sept 62), by political benefits of letting tough Soviet military contingency, or (may be trade with warheads, to compensate for softness now), or belief we are highly unlikely to do it given the warning (like the English, JFK vs K; K vs blockade in Sept 23, 62?)

Or, he might be obligated to pass info on, if "defensive", "intermediate" or "specific" — to others who would then take counteraction or pass him to take action.

(So, release him of this responsibility: English threat vs K; K vs JFK in Sept 62; Egon vs warning of an attack to K? Egon vs telling Kins early?)

Some reasons for appearance of laws:

- 9) Complexity of network : different sets + weightings at different times, places
(+ different weightings by different people, with
different perspectives and obligations)

2) You can't discuss freely all matters or info — even within gov.

3. Different motives relating to policy statements : different auditable audiences, different circumstances.

4 4. - Test of controversy, difference of opinion, benevolent
parties, opposition.

Neustadt. (Friedrich Schlegel)

Price commitments, policies.

Epstein: Central Relations in the Suez Crisis

Suez

connection

1. Eden had been main figure in moving out of Israel in 1954 — against opposition of Suez Group in his own party. (Had this been remembered by Left troops moving into in 1956?)

Did not Marwan move — right after Treacher moved out — tend to discredit Eden's policy, vindicate his opposition; specifically, indicating "conciliatory" or "trusting" policy were wrong and encouraged "defiance."

"But cooperation — general; Britain was helped to return
b) Cuba | from Egypt. It was on this prospect that Eden now
c) Korea? | stated some of

2.2. Eden — like JFK — 62 (Groom — 50, or not?)

was suspected of being undermining and insufficiently
dedicated to the goals served by intervention.

3. The "provocation" was seen as an opportunity by the
Suez Group: to topple Marwan, ~~start~~ again Canal, ~~reassert~~

British influence in ME and independence of US,
maintain imperial roles.

Just as Eden was opportunity to invade
Cuba, Tupper Centre (resisted by JFK; just as
Eden finally abandoned his opportunity.)

And — as there was opportunity to shift
defense spending policy, means, is called for by VSC-68.

And in Pearl Harbor was opportunity.

4. Then Eden, like JFK (& Gannon?) knew that man
would have strong support of an otherwise oppositionist
group (in his party; JFK — in Parliament); and would
increase his own criticism of Eden. And under himself.

(Indeed, JFK, Eden knew opposing party was
opposed, and some elements of it were

Thus, "provocation" was moving against an opposite
opportunity for an "increase." (Actually, heads of state weren't
waiting, but Eden were).

5. To have failed to make "opportunity" to move
evidently — (and independently, in long run) would have
exposed him — like JFK. (See Tanner?) to
sharp attacks; "revealed" indecisiveness & weakness,
truth of charges against him.

(Eg of Pugs, Cuba)

6. Style & nature of provocation — which discredited
policy of at-all-costs leader — was seen as offensive,
defiance ("impudence") — infuriating, and
humiliating, and damaging to prestige and influence
in the eyes of third parties.

Leader only. Inst. P.C. of Eg — reinstated

(Then: Tanner, on beating of Stark in Korea:

"Where beards! Why call to that to me!"

Tanner's first he had been winded — by Evans?!
[by his intelligence?]

Cuba

7. ~~the~~ issue of govt : a) concealing prior knowledge
(of Oswald's threat); (also collusion, not charged
in Cuba — of having told Oswald they would join, &
would vote in 14

a) deceiving people as to plans, intentions.

a) deceiving and not honestly advising.

d) not telling President & all of Cabinet (by of Pige, etc;
not issue in US?)

(Role of Congress in Cuba? out of session?)

8. [a. Did Elm know of prospective Dallas withdrawal of
support of Dom? Examine children, Bond to Elm,
161-62, 191].

Legal.

8. Difference: lack of organized political opposition
in the US case: Cuba I & II, Korea. What might
have produced it in US?

Main opposition in US is Democrats, not in Republicans
in Cuba. Still, why not more criticism?

9. Question: What were Kasser's expectations? Why did he
think he could get away with it? (as K in Cuba;
Haber).

10. Role of elections. Randolph Churchill, Prime & Fall of
Sir Anthony Eden, London 1957, p. 293. Britain thought
she would be preoccupied with election, or worried
about offending French voters. I thought American opinion
would swing from "benevolent neutrality" to "hostile
neutrality." (Uncertainty recognized.) Eugene Hayes.

11. End of first example: to be sincerely
committed (by attraction) before US or British
(Colinvalet / Party / Labor) opposition could see need &
opportunity to commit itself, to later move; & oppose strongly
(First example as giving first move
first commitment: and, against internal & external opposition).

(part of which gets "credit" for being
committed & opposition (Labor; ^{US} JFK & others)
actual dispute considerable commitment by initiator: in
part because they had committed themselves earlier,
and open move, ^{without continuity or warning} looked like defiance of their
oppressed desire.

12. Phenomenon: refusal of US to move British to
same force - forcing it to withdraw before could
be made (i.e. before, to stop before attack succeeded, -
intention of meeting successful attack is better than
US encouraged failure - even if worse than no attack).

[On change of Alkalinity:

When α is small

26 July

W on testimony given: Kennedy is wounded by the
allied gov involved, because of their anticipation of
the reaction of their governments. public

(particularly in the face of many protests, incidents.)

Also, Indian gov, flights over Himalayan passes.

American gov did know of nature of flights, contrary
to what Nixon told Congress.

(Note: they preferred to be open to charges of
not knowing, than to charges of knowing.)

[Might Carter have claimed lack of knowledge?

Distrib. 18 Sept: info 7 Sept, acquired 15 Sept

resident of Kansas (K) with good contacts among high level
officials in the railroad industry.

incl. para 1: (4) 2: 3

1. A large zone in Pinar del Rio Province within a perimeter
is being guarded by PRC troops.

(14 cont. It is believed that ground forces could
effectively control as an complete area a zone as large
as the one cited above.)

2. Plantation guarded; several activity; said to be mission.



Canell: given the ban, it took high level attention to get
outside of normal publication limits to get anything
banned up the line.

[Does media analysts to pass on the info, if
not, e.g. in the Cuban Daily Evening - read carefully
in DCP's office. ?]

(Everyone conscious of need to be able to explain,
if there ever is a mishap, the justification for the flight
in terms of highest priority needs.

Accountable reports (Hansen) received by analysts 24 Sept,
landed ^{by} ~~by~~ 27 Sept. Next, 1 Oct, away.
^{report C-3}
C-3, report ~~trans.~~, number landed at 11 and 19 Sept.

There triggered targeting powers. Target selected was
that material in report of 2 Sept; not much attention had
been paid to this at the time, possibly because DCP evaluation
of reports paragraph reporting land area was 4.

But, with these three reports...

Dec 22
J.C. : May instruction

M.C. noted we could have gotten it maybe a week or ten days earlier, but Carroll replied, would what you could have gotten a week or ten days earlier have been enough to convince anybody — look at the trouble we had convincing people with what we got on the 14th.

It could be felt this had been a little victory

could we have got nothing to be released if even if we do have a SNIE we can't buy. This report first doesn't let us put our best foot forward.

on Chalkhat
Benton Hill, we didn't put refugee reports in the Chalkhat or the CIE.

MI-62889 Call it 4
of 70 in Benton

[Was a Soviet heftian plan postulated?

Were high-level assurances relayed for White House?
available to CIA?]

Alison. The whole group was fearful of another U-2 incident in early October. Everybody was reluctant to see another dog get shot down, but also was anxious to avoid jeopardizing the approval to fly U-2s, which might well have happened on the heels of a public exposure. Carter also observed how difficult it had been to obtain approval of the U-2s from Taylor, and through him, from the President. Also, there were plans to use U-2s in the Far East, which would need approval.

[So, people at lower levels had and to be cautious themselves, but they had the approval of higher levels.]

4 Oct DCI at SG [Lang?] pressed for an answer
of western Cuba, charged that CIA was being restricted
to the southern only. The AG was quite provoked and
claimed that there had been no requirements submitted
for the western end, and that at no time had the
Pres or the SG turned down any flights CIA asked for.
It is that it was known that the DCI's sensitivity to
our liability in the face of JAMs was low.

Flight plans approved on 9th. This flight was
intended to discover if the SAMs were operational. The
flight plan was laid out to cover the two most advanced
and if these were not operational, then they would go
for thorough coverage of western Cuba inland for
the next mission. The Pres signed the 9th 14 mission
but withheld approval for the next mission until the
results of the 14th. were known.

The SAC pilot, new to the area, got lost and
was overcast and only by persistent overflights the
San Cristobal area. He was close to but some distance
to the south of where he should have been when he
overflew the MRPMs.

29 Sept: Went good. Flight ended for NE pickup, poor weather; other planes over side of river.

7 Oct. All clear - good: flight over NE pickup.

Completed left missions; Oct missions not yet authorized.

8-11 Oct: File weather not checked

[Any question?]

29 Sept no weather check (?)

31 Aug - 4 Sept " " " (no left missions yet authorized)

W: On 10 Sept an ad hoc mission by the SC in Bangkok office drew a flight plan for a single mission to cover the bulk of what COMOR asked on 5 Sept. Subsequently, Frank divided this single mission into 4 missions. 4 many days had to be found. (Probably they fly all together - 4 airplanes sent staff.)

Weather led to the present record (0.7 over) at
21 Sept. Time of the decision, 9 hours before takeoff.

Three scheduled missions cancelled because of poor ($3\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{1}{2}$ over) to bad weather over areas of desired coverage: Sept 7, 17, 22, 28, Oct 2; one on Sept 13 found target (Biter of Pines) obscured.

[~~Sept 13~~ by Standdown plus loss of flight over China on 8 Sept till 16 Sept]

Between 16 Sept and 14 Oct, weather poor to bad over targets for at least 18 of the 39 days.

Out optimum overflight conditions between 16 - 24 Oct (some of best weather was observed in China).

Sept 7 planned for Southwest China; cancelled for poor weather.

16 Sept: West - good; Central + East poor. Flight aborted; delayed by poor weather over targets in Eastern China. Cancelled 17 Sept.

26 Sept: West - good, East - good. Central - poor. Flight over SE-China, Burma.

27 Sept West - good; 29.

The sensitivity attached, after early Sept., to the presence of offensive weapons systems in Cuba had the effect of requiring a higher grade of proof in order to demonstrate to policy-makers that a major qualitative change had taken place in the Soviet arms build-up.

[Who wrote this? Evidence?]

[Higher than would have been necessary, say, on Aug 25?]

The numerous reports of offensive missile activity for a long period prior to the beginning of the arms build-up, some of which had been substantiated and many of which had been disproved, increased skepticism among intelligence analysts of subsequent reports of such missiles, especially in terms of photo verification.

[If reports were taken less seriously as evidence than if they had not many earlier reports & ad hoc as earlier opportunity to check & disprove reports by photos.]

Tentative Conclusions of Interim Report

- Int. com's somewhat lacking awareness of the offensive threat was reflected by the absence of requirements specifically targeted against this particular threat (except for 33rd Troop - 14 Oct mission).
- SI gave intell on ship movements & launch of an export, but did not believe to disclose his intentions [role of SI?] or action in deploying missiles.

(Reference: ship photos (except 21-22); Soviet success in body diplomats of friendly nations, intell from coverage of 20 (except 21-22 training).

But: refugees; agents (about 100 men & women); photos — though program not planned with adequate vigor during development period of arms-buildup to provide coverage of all parts of the island with sufficient frequency.

From Report: first major explosion associated with
offensive missiles arrived about 6 Sept,
first IRBM with increased to rate about
17 Sept.

Pictures of I-28 crates of 28 Sept took 12 days to
reach Washington. Unmistakable I-28 prints seen in Cuba
15 Oct. IRBM site 15 Oct.

West end of Cuba not photographed between 29 Aug
and 14 Oct. (6 weeks!)

And Sore happened to build from west to east.

[Suppose clouds had covered west end of
island on 29 Aug + 5 Sept. Then east + central
SAMS would have been seen first, attention turned
to west. Then, if flight had been delayed till,
say, 20 Sept. [There was weather on west end
+ Sept?] we would have seen ^{might} IRBMs — perhaps
before reports!]

[But we wouldn't have seen any SAMS till 20-25 Sept
in east.]

Procedures adopted in Sept. delayed photo intell.
but the delay was not critical, because photos obtained
prior to about 17 Oct. [?] would not have been
sufficient to warrant action of a type which
would require support from Western Hemisphere or
NATO Allies.

[Might it have involved our justification for
a fact example?]

14. Will need early set of requirements for strike? [M.N.?]
[Syracuse?]

[50 centers, 75 bands for MRCMS, + 100 centers for airfields,
+ 200 for SAMs. 2000 centers / 4000 bands for invasion.]

[Thought: K planned to come to NY, (NY State in November -
after American elections; K thought meeting at that time
would be useful. G instructed to make clear

that aid to Cuba was solely for the purpose of contributing
to the defensive capability of Cuba.

JFK's visit to Cuba was having a profound impact on
American people & Congress. G. national. Ed. of Pipe
Pier at in that he already told K that was a mistake,
and that had he been asked he would have given
assurances there would be no further increase. Thought.

But since July when our shipments started, situation
had changed. G. His specialists were giving warning in

and the entire kind of defensive move - and he wanted to discuss
the word defensive

18 Oct. Joint GMAC-JAEC-NDIC Evaluation.

MRBM could be launched within 15 hours.

18 Oct. DCI asked US B-2 consider two reactions to
three possible sources of action:

2) To do nothing about offen. missiles

4) Total or limited blockade under declaration of war

4) Military action to destroy missiles and missile sites.

SNIE 11-18-62 (18-19 Oct.)



5 Oct }
7 Oct } *important minutes*

5 Oct: US/B memo on ^{little fact.} 0-2 flts. *primary objectives on a north*

7 Oct 36 (Aug) [?] decided to verify a SAM site in western Cuba

led to threat of 14 Oct.

(5 Oct: 'COVER messages increased risk to aircraft in light of the 36-2 and May-21 aircraft present there, but it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent and the risks involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied.'

7 Oct: 36 (Aug) dismissed spectrum of reason. First priority ^{underlying} to one 0-2 over western end. If no fire, similar action.

[How sure was this decision? What if its lead shown false?]

10-12 *uncommented*. 12 Oct: noted passed to SAC.

18, 16 17 Oct 3 NIE 11-17-62 drafted.

14 Sept: SG considered proposal on low altitude (for
Bases. Noted that Red Dog didn't want this
considered till results of CH flights available.

15-16 Sept: weather checked daily for flight. cancelled.

17 Sept: flt. over Bases. sand cover.

18-21: delayed, cancelled.

22-26: delayed, flown on 26. Bases.

27 Sept: SG approved CH forecast for one mission in
Oct, + any Sept flights not yet flown (4 flights
remained when forecast drafted).

29 Sept: Sale of Pairs, Bg of Pigs.

29-30 Oct: peripheral considerably cancelled.

* mission sand cover.

3 Oct: DIA memo to COMOR: suspect MRBM miss. COMOR targeting

4 Oct: BG (Aug): DCI said CH restricted to using U-2's

in SE quadrant because of SAMs. Also highlighted
but operation bilateral. DCI questioned.

NRD to present program for 1st mission to BG (Aug)
on 9 Oct.

[1. When was mission planned by CIA originally?

Was it planned for 6 Sept, delayed by weather?

" " " " 10 Sept " " incidents?

Why was special meeting called for 10 Sept? incidents?

2. Faults: Lack of pressure by intell comm - Sept for

more flights or coverage of event and.

Analysts only - incidents
- policy and analysis SOAs

reception on 10 Sept at time

McC's reception that Septs could proceed

Because of limited number of flights authorized, CIA made it a practice not to fly unless weather over most of critical targets was less than 25% overcast. Poor weather + 4 separate flights \Rightarrow longer time to get requested photo coverage.

[B.I. note - no new urgent requests.]

He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters.

On the other hand, he recognized the necessity for obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would place the US in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the CH plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts — the Isle of Pines, the area roughly east of it, and two legs along the coast — one north and one south.

(See sketch proposal of 4 parts.)

8 Sept. COMOR reviewed results.

9 Sept. memo to A/DCI

possible SAM at

Mission didn't cover side of Pines (SAMs) or jet bases

or other critical areas which could be searched
for SAM and possible SAM deployment.

Recommend another mission is done in weather permits
for targets mentioned above.

D/ISA told COMOR that ^{the} State had asked whether
bases could be covered by peripheral means.

(20 miles out).

10 Sept. COMOR replied: could not satisfy requirements for
bases, or search ^{area} for SAMs further inland, nor
for further Mig-21 units on island bases or for
technical install.

10 Sept. special meeting (of 7) in HCB's office after
2 U-2 incidents. Tom Barnett wrote memo: ^{"Sept}

Rec State, AG, A/DCI & others, Rec State expressed
concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, involving
extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs
directly over Cuba on each side in one flight.

7 Sept: special meeting of COMOR in light of 29 Aug results.
Requirements for next flight agreed. No need for 30 return

Because of known SAM sites ^{with danger to our flight} plus need for lubrication of
Bones, COMOR thought first flight should be brought
to attention of Acting DCI.

9 Sept: News from COMOR to R/DCI acting approved.

In view of finding SAM sites on western end of
island, it is particularly important that we cover
as much as possible the next authorized mission
should cover those areas of the island which
were not photographed because of weather or
because the range did not permit.

in C. That the complex at the eastern end of
island should be photographed again, but
there is no requirement at this time for
recovery of the SAM sites.

8 Sept: eastern & central portions of island; land cover
in East.

0-2 flights begin 26 Oct 60. Till 12 Oct, 62: 54 flights.

After Feb 62, 2/month.

2 extra in June.

12 July: SG (Aug) agreed to continue 2/month.

19 July: MC proposals: 2/month (covered by existing authorization). Plans will approve, through medium of CG Monthly Forecast, flights planned for each succeeding month.

30 July: SG Approves 2 for Aug.

5 Aug: results inadequate, camera malfunction; CO-402 requested 2 more flights in Aug.

8 Aug: flts. cancelled; cancelled for bad weather, sp. features.

9 Aug: SG: second mission under DCI desirable necessary.

If 3rd mission necessary later in month, should be considered on its merits at that time.

Notes: 10 Aug for 12; 17 Aug; daily between 17-24 Aug, when mission cancelled. (Cancelled).

Next mission delayed by weather till 29 Aug.

8 S4M sites.

30 Aug: SG approves forecast for 2 flights for Sept.

SNIE 85-62, 17 Jan. Threat to US Security Interests in
Cuba. Area

NIE 85-62 21 March S.T. & Prospects in Cuba

NIE 85-2-62 1 Aug. " "

SNIE 85-3-62 19 Sept. Military Build up in Cuba.

Estimates developed are: a) overall US policy,
including policy w.r.t. US; b) US policy w.r.t. Latin
America; c) US relations with Castro, presence in Cuba,
and the military build-up.

Est. calculations:

a) US policy w.r.t. US: To avoid the risk of
confrontation with a high degree of risk of losing
Cuba, or (b) going to war.

b) in C.A. & Cuba: policy designed to win victory
by other than military means, and this would be
disparaged by street boss.

c) Military build up probably supported until these
policies.

7 Sept } (Bones?)

13 Sept } contributions on publicly offensive weapons discussed
in USIB.

(info after mid-Sept, was included in briefings and memos
by DIA for SecDef and JCS.

(State? But not HqG, Pres?)

11 Oct IL-28 published. USIB meeting getting up PSALM
(Pres order 10 Oct)

Discussion of new info on offensive weapons limited to
USIB principals only.

Restrictions

May 62: DCI told analysts to check out with NPIC
any reports susceptible to photo verification.

Mid-August (22 Aug?) DCI urged Press on increasing volume
of agent-refugee reports; Press directed
every effort to check out these reports. DCI told DC/T
to check any available source, particularly VPIC.

[Then, weather forecasts on photos
affected in inhibition about publishing].

Instruction "can be interpreted by CIA analysts as
a restriction on publishing anything that could not be
verified by NPIC. At least one item on SAMs, nothing
susceptible... was published in CIB, Summary or Checklist
that had not been so verified.

31 Aug: Press ordered USC, through Acting DCI, not to publish
results of 29 Aug flight ID policy incident.

(Did this include suspicion on Banes, or
just SAMs? Banes returned 5 Sept?)

Banes published 17 ^{3.1st} Sept; SAMs after 4 Sept.

little hard work of low ception program:

low "Disinformation" Bureau covert program against VP.

US/B Colonial Watch Report. fully formally coordinated

all sources usually. crisis areas.

Also on agenda 21 Aug; reviewed 23 Aug.

Effect of restraints on liaison. need to concentrate

info at decision making levels of HQs.

[Contrast to ground situation; effects?]

[Was Cuban response hampered by

lack of prior planning? Might it have been,
if developed differently?]

March 62: CIA Cuban Daily Summary established - meant

support to officers responsible for land/air collection

of S. Subject to publishing restrictions.

[Used as source for Pres Checklist?]

[No items on offensive weapons in Checklist; ^{restrictions} regional in notes]

^{established}
Cuban Highlights on 27 Aug for Special Group (Argentina)

to 19 Sept.